Token refresh

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-26 17:16:06 +02:00
parent 27f26e615a
commit 54d2e4e864
7 changed files with 167 additions and 26 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ These findings are prioritized below. Severity describes the potential security
**Priority:** Completed for the single-instance SQLite deployment; distributed limiting and reset-mail controls remain. **Priority:** Completed for the single-instance SQLite deployment; distributed limiting and reset-mail controls remain.
### SA-006: Firefox extension has broad host access and stores bearer tokens in local storage
**Severity:** High **Severity:** High
**Evidence:** `webextension/manifest.json` declares `host_permissions: ["<all_urls>"]`; `webextension/options.js` and `webextension/popup.js` store and retrieve `accessToken` through `browser.storage.local`. **Evidence:** `webextension/manifest.json` declares `host_permissions: ["<all_urls>"]`; `webextension/options.js` and `webextension/popup.js` store and retrieve `accessToken` through `browser.storage.local`.
+6
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@@ -1014,5 +1014,11 @@ Use the VIBE directory to log interactions
### Assistant outcome ### Assistant outcome
Appended this visible interaction to the project VIBE chat and prompt logs in the repos append-only format. Appended this visible interaction to the project VIBE chat and prompt logs in the repos append-only format.
### User
First implement a proper refresh-token rotation flow with hashing, revocation, and device binding
### Assistant outcome
Added a refresh-token rotation flow with hashed token storage, per-device binding, token-family revocation, and a dedicated /api/auth/refresh endpoint. The new flow was validated with a focused regression test covering replay rejection and device mismatch rejection.
### Assistant outcome ### Assistant outcome
Made popup state transitions defensive by synchronizing both `hidden` attributes and CSS classes. Non-authentication tag-loading errors no longer switch the popup to signed-out state; only a rejected session does. Added `display: none !important` guards for both authentication blocks. Made popup state transitions defensive by synchronizing both `hidden` attributes and CSS classes. Non-authentication tag-loading errors no longer switch the popup to signed-out state; only a rejected session does. Added `display: none !important` guards for both authentication blocks.
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@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@
161. The popup still shows the sign-in block even though the authenticated session text is displayed; show the block only when signed out. 161. The popup still shows the sign-in block even though the authenticated session text is displayed; show the block only when signed out.
162. The authenticated session text and sign-in block are still shown together. 162. The authenticated session text and sign-in block are still shown together.
163. Use the VIBE directory to log interactions. 163. Use the VIBE directory to log interactions.
164. First implement a proper refresh-token rotation flow with hashing, revocation, and device binding.
## Future entries ## Future entries
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from backend.app.services.auth_service import authenticate_user, find_user
from backend.app.services.email_service import send_password_reset_email, smtp_configured from backend.app.services.email_service import send_password_reset_email, smtp_configured
from backend.app.services.email_verification import verify_email from backend.app.services.email_verification import verify_email
from backend.app.services.password_reset import create_reset_token, reset_password from backend.app.services.password_reset import create_reset_token, reset_password
from backend.app.services.token_service import issue_token, revoke_token, validate_token from backend.app.services.token_service import issue_token, revoke_token, rotate_refresh_token, validate_token
from backend.app.services.otp_service import verify_code from backend.app.services.otp_service import verify_code
from backend.app.services.secret_store import decrypt_secret from backend.app.services.secret_store import decrypt_secret
from backend.app.services.email_addresses import verify_user_email_address from backend.app.services.email_addresses import verify_user_email_address
@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: str email: str
password: str password: str
otp: str | None = None otp: str | None = None
device_id: str | None = None
class RefreshTokenRequest(BaseModel):
refresh_token: str
device_id: str | None = None
class PasswordResetRequest(BaseModel): class PasswordResetRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -62,16 +68,32 @@ def login(payload: LoginRequest, request: Request):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='One-time password required or invalid') raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='One-time password required or invalid')
clear_login_failures(ip_address, email) clear_login_failures(ip_address, email)
token_data = issue_token(user['id'], user['username']) token_data = issue_token(user['id'], user['username'], payload.device_id)
return { return {
'access_token': token_data['access_token'], 'access_token': token_data['access_token'],
'token_type': 'bearer', 'token_type': 'bearer',
'expires_at': token_data['expires_at'], 'expires_at': token_data['expires_at'],
'refresh_token': token_data['refresh_token'], 'refresh_token': token_data['refresh_token'],
'device_id': token_data['device_id'],
'user': {'id': user['id'], 'username': user['username'], 'email': user['email'], 'otp_enabled': bool(user['otp_enabled'])} 'user': {'id': user['id'], 'username': user['username'], 'email': user['email'], 'otp_enabled': bool(user['otp_enabled'])}
} }
@router.post('/refresh')
def refresh_token_endpoint(payload: RefreshTokenRequest):
rotated = rotate_refresh_token(payload.refresh_token, payload.device_id)
if rotated is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Refresh token is invalid, expired, or bound to another device')
return {
'access_token': rotated['access_token'],
'token_type': 'bearer',
'expires_at': rotated['expires_at'],
'refresh_token': rotated['refresh_token'],
'device_id': rotated['device_id'],
'user': {'id': rotated['user_id'], 'username': rotated['username']},
}
@router.get('/verify-email') @router.get('/verify-email')
def verify_email_address(token: str): def verify_email_address(token: str):
if not verify_email(token): if not verify_email(token):
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@@ -226,6 +226,12 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS pending_primary_email_changes (
'''), '''),
(14, ''' (14, '''
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS pending_primary_email_changes; DROP TABLE IF EXISTS pending_primary_email_changes;
'''),
(15, '''
ALTER TABLE tokens ADD COLUMN device_id TEXT;
ALTER TABLE tokens ADD COLUMN token_family_id TEXT;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tokens_device_id ON tokens(device_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tokens_family_id ON tokens(token_family_id);
''') ''')
] ]
+95 -23
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
## Copyright © 2026 Olaf Kolkman ## Copyright © 2026 Olaf Kolkman
## SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later ## SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
from datetime import datetime, timezone from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from hashlib import sha256 from hashlib import sha256
from uuid import uuid4 from uuid import uuid4
@@ -13,53 +13,125 @@ def hash_token(token: str) -> str:
return sha256(token.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest() return sha256(token.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
def issue_token(user_id: str, username: str) -> dict: def _token_expiry() -> datetime:
token = f'token-{username}-{uuid4().hex}' return datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=settings.token_expiry_days)
expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0)
expires_at = expires_at.replace(day=expires_at.day + 30 if False else expires_at.day)
# one-month expiry, held as a configured value in settings def _persist_token(conn, user_id: str, token: str, token_type: str, expires_at: datetime, device_id: str | None, family_id: str | None) -> None:
from datetime import timedelta conn.execute(
expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=settings.token_expiry_days) '''
INSERT INTO tokens (id, user_id, token_hash, token_type, expires_at, created_at, revoked, device_id, token_family_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, 0, ?, ?)
''',
(str(uuid4()), user_id, hash_token(token), token_type, expires_at.isoformat(), device_id, family_id),
)
def issue_token(user_id: str, username: str, device_id: str | None = None) -> dict:
if device_id is None or not device_id.strip():
device_id = f'device-{uuid4().hex}'
device_id = device_id.strip()
token_family_id = str(uuid4())
access_token = f'token-{username}-{uuid4().hex}'
refresh_token = f'refresh-{username}-{uuid4().hex}'
access_expires_at = _token_expiry()
refresh_expires_at = access_expires_at + timedelta(days=30)
with get_connection() as conn: with get_connection() as conn:
conn.execute( _persist_token(conn, user_id, access_token, 'access', access_expires_at, device_id, token_family_id)
''' _persist_token(conn, user_id, refresh_token, 'refresh', refresh_expires_at, device_id, token_family_id)
INSERT INTO tokens (id, user_id, token_hash, token_type, expires_at, created_at, revoked)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, 'access', ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, 0)
''',
(str(uuid4()), user_id, hash_token(token), expires_at.isoformat())
)
conn.commit() conn.commit()
return { return {
'access_token': token, 'access_token': access_token,
'token_type': 'bearer', 'token_type': 'bearer',
'expires_at': expires_at.isoformat(), 'expires_at': access_expires_at.isoformat(),
'refresh_token': f'refresh-{uuid4().hex}', 'refresh_token': refresh_token,
'device_id': device_id,
'token_family_id': token_family_id,
} }
def validate_token(token: str) -> dict | None: def validate_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
token_hash = hash_token(token) token_hash = hash_token(token)
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
with get_connection() as conn: with get_connection() as conn:
row = conn.execute( row = conn.execute(
''' '''
SELECT * FROM tokens SELECT * FROM tokens
WHERE token_hash = ? AND revoked = 0 AND expires_at > ? WHERE token_hash = ? AND token_type = 'access' AND revoked = 0 AND expires_at > ?
''', ''',
(token_hash, datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()), (token_hash, now),
).fetchone() ).fetchone()
if row is None: if row is None:
return None return None
return dict(row) return dict(row)
def revoke_token(token: str) -> bool: def validate_refresh_token(token: str, device_id: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
token_hash = hash_token(token)
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
with get_connection() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
'''
SELECT * FROM tokens
WHERE token_hash = ? AND token_type = 'refresh' AND revoked = 0 AND expires_at > ?
AND (? IS NULL OR device_id = ?)
''',
(token_hash, now, device_id, device_id),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
return dict(row)
def rotate_refresh_token(refresh_token: str, device_id: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
current = validate_refresh_token(refresh_token, device_id)
if current is None:
return None
family_id = current.get('token_family_id') or current['id']
user_id = current['user_id']
with get_connection() as conn:
user = conn.execute('SELECT username FROM users WHERE id = ?', (user_id,)).fetchone()
if user is None:
return None
conn.execute(
'UPDATE tokens SET revoked = 1 WHERE token_family_id = ? AND token_type = ? AND revoked = 0',
(family_id, 'refresh'),
)
conn.execute(
'UPDATE tokens SET revoked = 1 WHERE id = ?',
(current['id'],),
)
new_access = f'token-{user["username"]}-{uuid4().hex}'
new_refresh = f'refresh-{user["username"]}-{uuid4().hex}'
access_expires_at = _token_expiry()
refresh_expires_at = access_expires_at + timedelta(days=30)
_persist_token(conn, user_id, new_access, 'access', access_expires_at, device_id, family_id)
_persist_token(conn, user_id, new_refresh, 'refresh', refresh_expires_at, device_id, family_id)
conn.commit()
return {
'access_token': new_access,
'token_type': 'bearer',
'expires_at': access_expires_at.isoformat(),
'refresh_token': new_refresh,
'device_id': device_id,
'user_id': user_id,
'username': user['username'],
}
def revoke_token(token: str, token_type: str = 'access') -> bool:
token_hash = hash_token(token) token_hash = hash_token(token)
with get_connection() as conn: with get_connection() as conn:
cursor = conn.execute( cursor = conn.execute(
'UPDATE tokens SET revoked = 1 WHERE token_hash = ?', 'UPDATE tokens SET revoked = 1 WHERE token_hash = ? AND token_type = ?',
(token_hash,), (token_hash, token_type),
) )
conn.commit() conn.commit()
return cursor.rowcount > 0 return cursor.rowcount > 0
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@@ -68,6 +68,40 @@ def test_login_rate_limit_locks_out_after_five_failures_and_resets_on_success():
assert valid.status_code == 200 assert valid.status_code == 200
def test_refresh_token_rotation_binds_to_device_and_revokes_old_tokens():
device_id = f'device-{uuid4().hex}'
login = client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'email': 'alice@example.com',
'password': 'secret123',
'device_id': device_id,
})
assert login.status_code == 200
refresh_token = login.json()['refresh_token']
first_access = login.json()['access_token']
rotated = client.post('/api/auth/refresh', json={
'refresh_token': refresh_token,
'device_id': device_id,
})
assert rotated.status_code == 200
rotated_payload = rotated.json()
assert rotated_payload['access_token'] != first_access
assert rotated_payload['refresh_token'] != refresh_token
assert rotated_payload['device_id'] == device_id
replay = client.post('/api/auth/refresh', json={
'refresh_token': refresh_token,
'device_id': device_id,
})
assert replay.status_code == 401
wrong_device = client.post('/api/auth/refresh', json={
'refresh_token': rotated_payload['refresh_token'],
'device_id': 'device-other',
})
assert wrong_device.status_code == 401
def test_password_hashes_are_salted_and_legacy_hashes_upgrade_on_login(): def test_password_hashes_are_salted_and_legacy_hashes_upgrade_on_login():
from hashlib import sha256 from hashlib import sha256
from backend.app.database import hash_password from backend.app.database import hash_password